Crib Sheet: Iraq Redeployment
An Iraq plan with a realistic timeline.
By Keith White, University of Virginia
Wednesday September 27, 2006
“Americans need and deserve a clear exit strategy for Iraq that spells out how much longer American troops will be involved in large numbers and what it will cost.”
-May 2006, Lawrence Korb & Brian Katulis, The Center for American Progress
"The current bankrupt course we are staying is focused only, or almost only, on security and is not complete even in that area."
-September 2006, retired Marine General Tony Zinni
“Conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq.”
-August 2006, Pentagon Quarterly Report
The Bush administration’s Iraq strategy remains rhetorically optimistic but substantively bankrupt. While the administration trumpets national elections, Iraqi security training, and a national unity government, the facts on the ground speak to a sad reality: Iraq is sliding into civil war.
Many progressive voices now consider a redeployment plan the best path to victory in Iraq. But what does redeployment mean? Redeployment calls for the vast majority of U.S. troops to leave Iraq over a set time scale. Some would stay in the region at the ready, others would return to their home bases, and still others would be redeployed to other anti-terrorism posts.
Redeployment as Our Best Option
As Iraq suffers from intensifying sectarian violence, American and other coalition fatalities continue to mount, and U.S.-led efforts at reconstruction still lag behind. Simply put, the Bush administration’s Iraq strategy isn’t working.
The crux of Iraq’s crisis resides not in terrorism, but in an emerging civil war: internal actors and holdovers from Saddam’s dictatorial rule are now violently competing for power and influence. There are many groups, including groups of Sunnis fighting for a return to something like Saddam’s rule, hard-line Shiite groups jockeying with moderates for the support of other Shiites, and Kurds hoping to maintain their regional autonomy. Such misery points to the fact that Iraq has yet to agree on how to address the nation’s fundamental divides. Prominent among the battles raging in Iraq is the competition between the national government and local authorities and the contentious process of distributing Iraq’s oil profits.
While the Bush administration has worked hard to create the appearance of an Iraqi national government, successfully producing a constitution, and national elections, Iraq’s central government has failed to assert national authority outside of Baghdad. The shocking weakness of Iraq’s central government is seen in Anbar province, where Marine Corps intelligence reports coalition forces are “defeated politically,” and al-Qaeda is Anbar’s “most significant political force.” With a weak Iraqi authority, the U.S. and allied forces must maintain order, but they can only serve as Band-Aids for a country in need of major surgery. Coalition forces so far have prevented all-out civil strife, but they have not resolved the core disagreement between varying groups in Iraq.
As James Fearon, a Princeton professor and a specialist on the subjects of civil war and ethic conflict, said in his testimony before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security in September 2006, there are only two successful approaches to ending a civil war. One is a decisive victory of one group over others. The other, far more rare, is the emergence of a power-sharing agreement between the antagonists.
The Bush administration has gone down neither path toward stability. U.S. forces never established complete control over the country. While our troops executed a highly effective plan to destroy the Saddam regime, the administration had no real plan for post-war Iraq. The ensuing power vacuum allowed non-state actors to gain power and prevented the formation of political institutions ready to bridge the nation’s many divides. As a result, violence is still the most powerful political tool in Iraq.
The administration has given our troops an impossible task: pursuing a peace-keeping strategy in a place without any peace to keep.
And the administration’s strategy of “staying the course” won’t bring any magic solutions. Fearon went on to testify that neither “ramping up” nor “staying the course” would “produce a democratic government that can stand on its own” after the departure of coalition troops. Foreign troops are not solving Iraq’s civil strife; they are merely bottling it up.
Some have argued that such a situation demands more troops. Regardless of the strategic wisdom of such a plan, it flunks the first test of any policy: feasibility. As the Center for American Progress’s Lawrence Korb and Peter Ogden argue in a recent Washington Post article, any troop increases in Iraq “threaten to break our nation’s all-volunteer Army and undermine our national security.”
Redeployment: Neither Retreat nor Surrender
A redeployment plan, if properly executed, is Iraq’s best hope for success. While still training Iraqi police and army forces, the U.S. military can truly stand down while Iraqi security forces stand up. There are several aspects to a successful redeployment strategy:
Phased withdrawal from Iraq
Representative John Murtha grabbed headlines by calling for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq. But neither he nor most progressive voices favor an “abandon Iraq” strategy. Murtha’s proposal called not only for American troops to leave Iraq, but also to have an “over the horizon force” outside of Iraq. Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis have filled out Murtha’s approach by calling for a phased withdrawal over two years. (Fred Kaplan writes about this approach in Slate.)
This is not a policy of surrender. Redeployment advocates recognize both the futility of America’s current Iraq strategy and the unfeasibility of drastic increases in troop levels. Thus redeployment plans call for gradually drawing our forces out of combat duty in Iraq while continuing the training of Iraqi security forces. Such a plan forces Iraqi leaders to begin a real dialogue on the issues that divide their nation.
Redeploying troops to nearby nations
While some troops would be sent back to home bases, troops would also be stationed near Iraq. Korb and Katulis offer some specifics: calling for 10,000 troops to join current American forces in Kuwait and an “over the horizon force” consisting of an aircraft carrier battle group and Marine expeditionary force. Korb and Katulis also recommend continuing America’s military presence in Bahrain and Qatar (Strategic Redeployment 2.0, page 15).
There are several different redeployment plans being circulated in policymaking circles, but all agree on a common strategy: Leave a credible force in nearby countries that could serve as an emergency security force while training the Iraqi security forces in the meantime. If intensive fighting breaks out in Iraq’s region, coalition forces would restore order. But if properly executed, the phased withdrawal of American troops could push Iraq to revolve its internal conflicts. Phased withdrawal puts greater accountability on Iraqi leaders, allowing Iraq to secure itself—instead of biding time with the security blanket of American troops.
And as Nir Rosen, a fellow at the New American Foundation who spent more than a year in Iraq after the war began, contends in a December 2005 article for The Atlantic Monthly, the presence of collation troops “fuels Sunni hostility toward ‘Shiite collaborators.” He goes on claim “the mere announcement of an intended U.S. withdrawal would allow Sunnis to come to the table and participate in defining the new Iraq.”
Peace Conference for Iraq
Korb and Katulis also call on President Bush to appoint a special envoy to lead a regional peace conference. They suggest building off the template of the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 and the Bonn Conference of 2002 for a Geneva Peace Conference for Iraq (Strategic Redeployment 2.0, page 19). Senator Joe Biden and Les Gelb, president e meritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, make a similar argument in their Iraq proposal. Both proposals recognize the need to enlist Iraq’s neighbors in the Iraqi reconstruction process.
Major actors in the region (including Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan), have so far been shut out of Iraq’s reconstruction. While this approach maximizes American influence on Iraq policy, it also places the burden on the shoulders of the United States. A redeployment plan that both removes mostAmerican troops from Iraq and involves Iraq’s neighbors would bring desperately needed resources and expertise to post-war reconstruction efforts. Why would countries such as Iran or Syria work with America to bring about a stable Iraq? Simple: a failed state in Iraq is a threat to all nations. The administration’s refusal to work collaboratively with important actors in the Middle East is dangerous for Iraq and for America’s security.
Strengthening Other Outposts
Pointing to another dimension of redeployment, Korb and Katulis call for strengthening forces where they can do the most good, most prominently Afghanistan, where military commanders have requested more troops from NATO countries. Specifically, they call for 20,000 more troops in Afghanistan. Korb and Katulis also propose the deployment of 1,000 special forces troops in Asia and Africa, and recommend increased U.S. training of foreign security forces to help them locate and expunge violent extremists and terrorist networks.
Korb and Katulis also advise the administration to jump-start diplomatic engagement in the Middle East. They propose creating a Gulf Stability Initiative to bring together the many actors in the region. The report from a Stanley Foundation conference chaired by Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman offers specific strategies for engaging Iran and Saudi Arabia in such an endeavor.
Redeployment plans are not meant to kowtow to America’s enemies, but defeat them and bring peace and stability in a smarter and more effective manner.
Redeployment Is the Only Option
Redeployment is not a plan of retreat, but a plan to strengthen America’s security and make the world safer. Redeployment recognizes reality and offers concrete proposals. In Iraq, our uncompromising and mostly unilateral approach to military deployment must change. The proposals of Murtha, Korb and Katulis, and Biden offer a real security strategy for the United States. Let’s hope the White House begins to listen, before the country wastes another three years on ineffective policies that cost America so much blood.
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To suggest “building off the template of the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995” will not be particularly useful. In Iraquagmire, the wolves are already through the barn door: their are no ‘partners for peace’ left who can deliver the Sunnis and the Shi’ia. Here’s what I suggest:
LEAVE.
— Vigilante - Sep 29, 11:47 AM - #To keep on doing what he is doing is not working. We should tell the Iraq government that we will be leaving Jan. 1, 2007. If they have no control at that time, the country will be divided into 3rds and the oil profits split between the 3 ethnic groops. The U.N will supply peace keeping troops and decide the borders and oversee the distribution of the oil profits.
— Mary Lou Czupek - Sep 29, 12:24 PM - #Our Constitution assigns responsibility for declaring war to CONGRESS. It does not give Congress the right to give that responsibility to a president and the president clearly has no authority to initiate war. We are in Iraq illegally spending $2 billion a week of money borrowed from Japanese and Chinese banks. A poll last week showed that 75% of Iraquis want us to leave within a year and 65% want us to leave now. What possible reason is there for us to keep soldiers in Iraq?
— Jana Lane - Oct 1, 07:09 PM - #This is a pretty good column; well-structured and reasoned. I agree that redeployment is necessary, in a phased manner after Iraqi security forces are able to provide internal security. Clearly this means that the regime will enjoy some measure of legitimacy from the ethnic groups of Iraq that are fighting it now. Does this mean a unitary state, or a confederation, or maybe autonomous areas under an umbrella state? I’m not sure, but I do know that failing here will only embolden the enemies of secular liberalism to fight elsewhere, and dishearten future allies of the U.S. in the next conflict. Islamic extremist enemies of the U.S. paint it as being weak-willed and decadent, and make no mistake, they despise liberalism and secularism. I think that questions of how we got involved in Iraq, how we are conducting the counter-insurgency, how our intellectual visualization was nearly bankrupt are all good questions. We should ask ourselves how long is a reasonable time-frame for conducting counter-insurgency? How long did it take the Britis in Malaysia? The U.S. in the Philippines (either with Magsaysay or turn of the 20th century)? How long for the Brits in Oman? Where counter-insurgency has been successful, how did it happen? Where it has been unsuccessful, how did that happen? I think that answer lies in years, many more than we have spent in Iraq. Clearly, the Iraq policy has been a failure and needs honest re-adjustment. Quitting and admitting defeat (which certainly will be the perception in the Islamic world) is not it.
— 53egradstudent - Oct 3, 01:10 PM - #Who declared war when we went into Korea to save the South? Wow, nobody. We went in as the UN. What forces will be there after the partition into 3 parts? Wow, it will be the US forces. Commenters get a clue before you show your lack of knowledge in international and military issues.
— Craig Clemens - Nov 2, 09:57 PM - #