Why young progressives should embrace charity.
By Andrew Benedict-Nelson, Johns Hopkins University
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Who are more charitable, liberals or conservatives? Not long ago, it would have seemed obvious to me that even if “liberals” was not the answer in every case, the people who gave the most back to society were probably on my side of the fence. Surely we campus progressives, inundated as we supposedly are with Marxist professors and social justice campaigns, would have to be among the most caring groups in society.
But a book that came out shortly after the November elections turned that conventional wisdom on its head. According to Who Really Cares, written by Syracuse University economist Arthur C. Brooks, it is conservatives who are more likely to act on such beliefs, even if they are less loud about them. For some liberals, Brooks’ conclusions have served as cause for alarm. Yet in fact, this book should give progressives hope; if its lessons are applied properly, it could serve as a guide for how we can revive the cause of remaking America into a more just society.
Brooks’s initial charges seem pretty damning. According to his research, while self-identified liberals and conservatives are equally likely to be charitable, conservatives give and volunteer significantly more despite having a slightly lower average income. In other words, conservatives give a higher proportion of what they earn than liberals. And it’s not just money. As Brooks puts it in one of the statistical snapshots that populate the book, “if liberals and moderates gave blood at the same rate as conservatives, the blood supply in the United States would jump by about 45 percent.”
What’s more troubling is that the attributes that tend to drive these differences play to conservatives’ strengths. A main factor in predicting charitable activity is, of course, religion. Brooks says that irrespective of political affiliation, people who frequently attend church or emphasize the importance of personal faith are significantly more likely to give money and volunteer, even to nonreligious causes.
When political affiliations enter into the mix, people who identify as conservative and religious are the most likely to exhibit charitable behavior, followed by religious liberals, secular liberals, and secular conservatives. And as the number of religious liberals shrinks and the number of religious conservatives grows, the rankings become even more stark. According to Brooks, statistics indicate that religious Democrats are the people most likely to switch their political affiliation.
Brooks then goes on to identify three more factors that make up the charity gap. Paradoxically, people who state that income inequality is a major problem in the United States are less likely to give—perhaps, Brooks suggests, because they believe the government should take care of the problem. The working poor are also more likely to give than those who receive government assistance. Finally, people who are married and come from stable families are also more likely to give, probably because family life reinforces charitable habits. These characteristics don’t just describe the stereotypical conservative; they fit nicely into the vision of America that many of them believe has been lost and needs to be restored.
Several commentators have made useful criticisms of Brooks’s research. The first is that surveys on charitable giving are notoriously unreliable and prone to manipulation. But be that as it may, Brooks does not seem to be either a statistical shyster or a right-wing crank; indeed, the book suggests that he initially doubted his own conclusions.
A second, more useful objection is that Brooks ignores the fact that unengaged political moderates are less likely than conservatives or liberals to give or be involved. But this doesn’t tell us much, since many of the factors Brooks identifies operate independently of stated political affiliation. For instance, people who think income inequality is a problem are less likely to give no matter what political group they think they belong to.
But a gut liberal reaction might be “So what?” Conservatives might give more, but they also claim to be happier and even to have better sex lives. Even if those statements are true, does it in any way affect the rightness of a political position? Indeed, doesn’t the degree of charity in the United States merely reflect a sort of latent guilt over our nation’s glaring income inequality?
Brooks illustrates this attitude with a quote from Ralph Nader: “A society that has more justice is a society that needs less charity.” Nader has since indicated that this remark was never intended to discourage giving. But nevertheless, it suggests a zero-sum relationship between the state and charity. In an ideal society, this implies, there would be no need for private giving, as the state would take care of everyone’s needs. Citizens would merely delight in paying taxes.
But as Brooks rightly points out, this will never describe America. It’s not that we are selfish; indeed, Americans give so much more to charity than citizens of other countries that giving is integrated into our politics, economy, and character. Charity supports “mediating structures,” from voluntary associations to parent-teacher groups, that are necessary to translate popular opinion into policy. Brooks also suggests that individuals and communities that give back foster a sense of entrepreneurship that encourages their economic well-being. And charity makes people happier and healthier as well, leading Brooks to characterize it as a “unique form of expression.”
Unique expressions sound like the sort of thing young progressives ought to be good at; after all, many of us can hardly brush our teeth without blogging about it. But we do not come out well in Brooks’s book. His data suggests that young liberals, particularly secular ones, are one of the more selfish groups in America. Rather than taking an accusatory tone, Brooks hopes that our generation will realize the seriousness of the giving gap and devise new ways of reinforcing charitable habits.
But our potential may be even greater than that. If the 55 percent of the country that voted for Bush were pharisees or fascists, it would have been high time for the blue states to annex themselves into Canada. Brooks’s research suggests that not only is this untrue, but that the “religious right” understands how to enact social change in a way that secular liberals do not. In doing so, he helps settle an ongoing debate among campus progressives about whether activities like service learning and Alternative Spring Breaks are useful steps toward a better world or self-indulgent distractions from more vital political concerns. If Brooks’s conclusions are to believed, these volunteer activities are not only beneficial, but vital tools to reach out to conservatives and create a better sort of politics.
If we can use charity to find common ground, justice may soon follow. Brooks is right to criticize the attitude expressed by Ralph Nader’s comments on charity and justice; but on nearly every major issue facing Americans today, from education to health care to the environment to Iraq, it is not charity but truth and justice that are lacking. If we who work for a just society can engage the great conservative charitable base, we could not only win converts to our cause, but find new and better ways of making that cause a reality.
Andrew Benedict-Nelson is a fellow with Leitner Public Affairs, where he works with a major nonprofit client and edits http://www.chicagowonk.com . He will begin work on a Ph.D. in the history of medicine at the Johns Hopkins University in the fall.
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Comments
Did they note in the blood giving scenario the fact that gay men cannot donate blood? The Red Cross refuses to accept it. I feel safe in assuming that most gay men and women are liberals, so this number skews favorably in the conservative direction. This policy also raises a few other issues about social acceptance, but thats another issue.
— anon - Jun 15, 10:47 PM - #