Reorganizing the International Service Bureaucracy
International service and foreign aid span too many departments and government agencies; what it needs is organization.
By Celia Segel
October 9, 2008
Sen. John McCain and Sen. Barack Obama talk as they walk together after participating in a Ground Zero 9/11 memorial observance in New York. (AP Photo/Stephan Savoia)On September 11, both major parties’ presidential nominees Barack Obama and John McCain put aside politics and joined together at Ground Zero to call on Americans to serve their country both at home and abroad. McCain criticized the Bush administration for not taking advantage of the spike in patriotism in 2001 to urge young Americans into civil service. Applauding international service programs like the Peace Corps, McCain announced, "I would have called [Americans] to serve." [Editor’s note: See our related article on a campaign to expand the Peace Corps.] Obama echoed McCain’s proactive attitude about civic responsibility. "Let us renew that spirit of service and that sense of common purpose," he declared. With both candidates encouraging Americans to serve their country abroad, international aid programs may have a promising future in American politics.
But there is a lot of work to be done to help programs like the Peace Corps and other international service organizations reach their full potential. International aid and service spans many different funding sources, departments, and government agencies. The result is a bureaucratic mess that a recent panel of experts who testified before Congress said could best be solved by creating a single government agency that administers international aid and service from a centralized location.
International aid is viewed as one of the three main pillars of homeland security (the other two are in diplomacy and the military), and is especially important in maintaining American influence internationally and preserving regional stability. International aid experts have for years complained about the lack of organization in foreign aid services. Many attribute it to the cobwebbed legislation dating back to John F. Kennedy’s Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, which over the decades has accrued thorough improvements, detailed earmarks, and extensive programs. The result has been something of a bureaucratic mess of poorly coordinated programs that fall low on Congress’ priority list. Without essential organization, failing programs become a bureaucratic drain on the aid budget and on worker morale.
Last month, a panel of experts met in the House of Representatives to discuss the future of international aid in the Americas. The experts called for a new umbrella department in Washington to coordinate international aid among programs. Mark Schneider, senior vice president and special advisor on Latin America for the International Crisis Group and ex-director of the Peace Corps, argued that international aid in the Americas is especially important now, where in recent weeks, the United States has seen its presence threatened by hostile South American governments—respected U.S. ambassadors have been expelled in mid-September from both Bolivia and Venezuela.
In recent years, legislators have worked around the FAA to create completely separate international aid legislation—including the Millennium Challenge, which gives development grants to well governed developing countries, and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which increases aid to Africa by $10 billion in 5 years. Many experts criticize the old Foreign Assistance Act as “fragmented,” and a recent Oxfam America report (PDF), calls it “more complicated than ever.” The report continues, “The FAA [features] 33 different goals, 75 priority areas, and 247 directives, and [is] being executed by at least 12 departments, 25 different agencies, and almost 60 government offices. This mix of agencies with different missions has made the efficient delivery of aid increasingly difficult.”
Additionally, the limited communication between departments, agencies, and offices often reflects poor quality in programming and creates a variety of short-sighted problems that obscure the ultimate goals of development aid. In one case, money aimed towards building a domestic market in Afghanistan was lost to failing businesses and factories that could not keep their prices down with cost standards set by India and Pakistan. In another project (also in Afghanistan), the budget to deliver roofing timber to a small town was distributed between three international NGOs—in Geneva, Washington D.C., and Kabul—before ultimately flopping locally by providing residents with a specific type of timber that was too heavy to be supported by their mud wall homes, according to the Oxfam report. Programs many times do not respond to the needs of communities and money gets wasted on bureaucracy and misguided aid, instead of community-based initiatives.
In 2007, Congress passed an amendment to the FAA, called the "F process," to help USAID better manage its departments by hiring a coordinator (nominated by the president). But many worry that the position could be misused to achieve political and diplomatic ends, rather than the developmental goals international service is typically thought to achieve. Panel experts argued for a fresh new bill to organize existing amendments and filter out failing programs under a new, centralized, cabinet-level department.
More transparency and fluidity amongst government programs and agencies will help solve the current problems with international service. However, it will take strong leadership of the next president, whoever that may be, to take comprehensive reform seriously. The election has highlighted necessary changes to international policy: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, potential conflict with Iran, genocide and political unrest in Africa, the complicated relationship between Russia and Georgia, and, of course, the never-ending cycle of suicide bombing followed by knee-jerk military force in Israel and Palestine.
The debates surrounding international service are oftentimes reactive—measures taken to fix problems that exist around the world. It will be the preventative measures—developing schools and roads, eliminating avoidable diseases, and confronting poverty worldwide—that may have long term effects on reducing international conflict. International aid works “to prevent the social injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feed,” according to American Enterprise Institute fellow Roger Bate in a 2006 issue of The American Interest. To be effective this complex and multi-faceted project will have to be prioritized, focused, and funded by a single department in Washington.
Celia Segel is a Policy and Advocacy Intern with Campus Progress.
Social Bookmarking
--------
Comments
!
Very informative article. It’s interesting to hear clear examples illustrating the very real administrative nightmares when it comes to international aid.
I had no idea – and am still having a bit of trouble fathoming it – that international aid is viewed as one of the three pillars of homeland security. Along with our military and diplomacy? Because considering the current state of affairs – when it comes to things like the retention rate of Peace Corps volunteers and Washington-born programs often not properly addressing the needs of communities on the ground – I would have never guessed.
— ashabpatel - Oct 11, 12:46 PM - #